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IS THE CRITICAL TRUST APPROACH TO
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE INCOMPATIBLE
WITH RELIGIOUS PARTICULARISM?
A REPLY TO MICHAEL MARTIN AND JOHN HICK
Kai-man Kwan

In contemporary philosophy of religion, many philosophers, e.g., William
Alston, argue that we should treat religious experiences as prima facie reliable unless we have reasons to doubt them. I call this a Critical Trust
Approach to religious experience. John Hick and Michael Martin have
argued that this approach is incompatible with a particularist solution to
the problem of religious pluralism. I argue that this is a misunderstanding
of the Critical Trust Approach. I further explore how a religious particularist who accepts this approach can deal with conflicts between presumptive
data, and argue that the particularist approach to religious experience is not
necessarily inferior to atheistic and pluralist approaches.

The Tension between the Critical Trust Approach and Religious Diversity
In recent years, there is a revival of the argument from religious experience

among analytic philosophers of religion. John Hick was one of its early
defenders. Richard Swinburne gave it epistemological sophistication by
propounding and defending the Principle of Credulity which says that if it
seems (epistemically) to one that x is present, then probably x is present
unless there are special considerations to the contrary.' While William
Alston does not agree with Swinburne on many (minor) points, his
Doxastic Practice Approach to religious experience is structurally similar to
Swinburne's. His Perceiving God is an impressive work which elaborates
and defends this approach by arguing that it is practically rational to
regard all socially established doxastic practices as prima facie reliable. 2 I
will call this kind of approach the Critical Trust Approach (CTA). The
Principle of Credulity is renamed The Principle of Critical Trust (PCT). The
name highlights two major and interdependent components of this epistemology: 1) initial trust of our experiences; 2) critical examination of those
experiences to see whether they are subject to defeaters. (The latter component is worth emphasizing because many tend to associate Swinburne's
Principle of Credulity or Alston's Doxastic Practice Approach with uncritical blind trusty According to John Hick, "Many of us today who work in
the philosophy of religion are in broad agreement with William Alston that
the most viable defense of religious belief has to be a defense of the rationality of basing belief (with many qualifying provisos which Alston has
carefully set forth) on religious experience."4
The most serious problem that the CTA faces is religious diversity. Four
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major approaches to account for the variety of religions and religious experiences are:

1) Religious Exclusivism/Particularism: only one world religionS is correct, and all others are mistaken. I prefer the name "particularism"
here because the word "exclusivism" has negative connotations.
Furthermore, exclusivism is often defined by Hick and others primarily in terms of salvation: "exclusivism asserts that salvation is confined to Christians."b It needs to be emphasized that religious particularism or exclusivism, as defined here, does not entail the above
view. It is even compatible with the most inclusive interpretation of
salvation, universalism, e.g., a particular interpretation of
Barthianism.
2) Religious Inclusivism: only one world religion is fully correct, but
other world religions participate in or partially reveal some of the
truth of the one correct religion.
3) Religious Pluralism: ultimately all world religions are equally correct, each offering a different, salvific path and partial perspective visa-vis the one Ultimate Reality.7
4) Atheism: all religions are mistaken; there is no God and no transcendent realm.
What are the theological implications of the CTA, if any? Does it lead to
some particular theological positions, e.g., pluralism? Is it compatible with,
say, Exclusivism?- this is an urgent question because in endorsing the
PCT, initially all religious experiences have to be accorded equal weight.
Isn't it then difficult to maintain that only one world religion is correct? As
Hick points out, the challenge is that "the same epistemological principle
establishes the rationality of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, etc in
holding beliefs that are at least partly, and sometimes quite radically,
incompatible with the Christian belief-system. Belief in the reality of Allah,
Vishnu, Shiva, and of the non-personal Brahman, Dharrnakaya, Tao seem
to be as experientially well based as belief in the reality of the Holy
Trinity."s
Of course Alston has been keenly aware of this problem but he maintains two things: 1) although the problem of religious diversity will reduce
the rationality of participating in the Christian Doxastic Practice, it does not
destroy it altogether; 2) the solution of this problem does not necessarily
lead to a pluralist hypothesis like Hick's theory; his approach is compatible
with the rationality of a religious particularist position. 9 In a Festschrift for
Alston, several philosophers also advocate a particularist position. lO In the
July 1997 issue of Faith and Philosophy, Hick attacks these "conservative
Christian philosophers" and a spirited debate between Hick, on the one
side and Alston, Mavrodes, van Inwagen, Plantinga, and K. J. Clark, on the
other, ensued. Hick's main purpose is to show that "we do not yet have
any adequate response from conservative Christian philosophers to the
problem of religious diversity.""
A main argument of his is that Alston's experience-based apologetics for
religion is incompatible with his exclusivism: "For if only one of the many
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belief-systems based upon religious experience can be true, it follows that
religious experience generally produces false beliefs, and that it is thus a generally
unreliable basis for belief-formation": this is then" a reversal of the principle,
for which Alston has argued so persuasively, that religious experience constitutes as legitimate a ground for belief-formation as does sense experience."12 In other words, Hick thinks that the combination of CTA and religious exclusivism is self-undermining. This is also a very common objection
raised against the argument from religious experience by atheists. For
example, Michael Martin asserts that the deliverances of religious experiences are so contradictory that as a whole they are shown to be unreliable.
As a result, the Principle of Critical Trust shouldn't be applied to religious
experiencesY While both Martin and Hick concur with the incompatibility
of the CTA and religious exclusivism, and thus the untenability of the first
approach, they draw different conclusionsY Martin does not seriously consider the pluralist hypothesis, and thinks that the conflict between religious
experiences tends to support the fourth approach, atheism. Hick maintains
that a religious interpretation of reality is still possible in the face of the conflict between religious experiences. However, only his religious pluralism
(the third approach) can save the day for those who do not accept atheism.
Hick also has other reasons for thinking that the CT A should lead to
religious pluralism rather than particularism, e.g., the latter is arbitrary and
unable to explain the roughly equal soteriological efficacy of the world religions. In this essay, however, I will concentrate only on the alleged incompatibility between the CTA and religious exclusivism 15 which is regarded
by D. Z. Phillips as a devastating criticism of Alston. 16 I argue instead that it
is the result of a misunderstanding of the CTA. Alston has already briefly
indicated this misunderstanding: "even if most beliefs based on religious
experience were false, that would not contradict the epistemological claims
I make for religious experience" which is that "its seeming to one that
some Ultimate Reality (UR) is presenting itself to one's experience as phi
makes it prima facie justified that UR is phi."17 However, in view of its persistence, this objection deserves a fuller treatment. I argue below that the
CTA is indeed compatible with particularism, and also that it is more consistent with particularism than with Hick's pluralism.

Applicability of the Principle of Critical Trust to Conflicting Experiences
The first question we should settle is whether the existing contradictions
between religious experiences make the PCT inapplicable to them. It is a
totally different one from the question: "if we grant some evidential force to
religious experiences, will such conflicts cancel this force?" Let us first distinguish the PCT from the following Probable Inference Rule (PIR):
PIR If it seems to me that x is F, then probably x is F in the sense that
it is more often than not the case that x is F.
A type of experience has type-reliability if more than half of its tokens are
veridical. The applicability of the PIR to a type of experience is tied to its
type-reliability. If it can be shown to be type-unreliable, then the PIR can
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hardly be applied to it. In the case when the tokens of that type grossly
conflict with one another, the type-reliability would be greatly in doubt
and hence the PIR is not applicable. So the presence of massive contradictions do debar us from applying the PIR. However, the applicability of the
PCT is not thereby endangered. To apply the PCT to some experiences is to
have initial trust in them and, if they are defeated, to salvage as much as
possible from them. The PCT does not entail the PIR. There is no contradiction in saying that we should have initial trust in conflicting experiences.
There is no contradiction even between legitimately having initial trust in a
type of experience and the fact that most tokens of that type turn out to be
unveridical! Since the PCT is often compared to the presumption of innocence in law, let us consider the following legal analogy. Suppose in a certain democratic country both the common people and the legal authority
are very cautious in prosecuting others. They will not do so unless overwhelming evidence is available. So it turns out that 99% of the suspects
were convicted and not even one such verdict was found to be wrong. On
the other hand, the legal procedure adheres strictly to the presumption of
innocence as well. That the above scenario is obviously possible shows that
there is no contradiction between these two statements: 1) each and every
suspect was legitimately presumed to be innocent in the beginning; 2) the
overwhelming majority of the suspects were in fact not innocent. Let me
further illustrate this with the Parable of the Survivors.
Suppose a nuclear holocaust occurs and the survivors are badly hurt by
radiation. Mutations occur such that during their seeing the proximal stimuli produced by external objects are always blended with internally generated noise. The result is that the apparent size, shape and color of a nearby
object can vary for different individuals and can also vary from time to
time for the same individual. The saving grace is that the noise level does
not exceed the threshold which would destroy altogether the capability of
object recognition. So the people can still, with difficulty, know that some
object is around. The result is a kind of "vision" which can roughly locate a
medium size object nearby but everything else is blurred and unstable.
Notice that the erroneous perceptions are always integrated with the
roughly correct identifications. Phenomenologically speaking, we can't
separate these two kinds of perceptions: the bare recognition of object versus the more detailed perception of color, shape and size. In this case
should those people accord some evidential force to their perceptions?
Suppose they don't and instead they adopt initial scepticism towards their
"perceptions." Namely, they insist that their perceptions have to be treated
as "guilty until proven innocent." Can they demonstrate the reliability of
their 'perceptions' by another means? Hardly! What about the availability
of tests? There may not be effective tests which have consistent results.
Scepticism results and would rob the people of the only information they
still possess! This consequence seems to be counter-intuitive. Instead it is
plausible to say the PCT is applicable here. By applying it, the survivors
will come to trust their ability to locate medium size objects while not giving undue confidence to their color and shape perceptions. The PCT is
"charitable" enough here without being unduly uncritical. The idea here is
that although the "perceptions," described at the highest level of descrip-
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tion, are grossly inconsistent, they do convey information about the reality
at a lower level of description. Indeed the parable is suggestive. It shows
that it is quite conceivable that even though religious experiences as a
whole are not entirely accurate, they can be reasonably informative at a
lower level of description. There is no a priori reason for believing that contradictions of experiences would entail their total unreliability.
Furthermore, almost all sorts of experience or doxastic practices produce conflicting beliefs sooner or later. Empirically speaking no experience
which we commonly regard as reliable is completely free from this problem. Oust think of the empiricists' "argument from illusion.") So why do
we think that the presence of contradictions in religious experience should
debar us from having initial trust, at least to a small degree, in religious
experience? We must have set a threshold amount of contradictions such
that if any epistemic practice produces an amount of contradictions
beyond this threshold, it will be subject to initial scepticism. In other
words, there is a minimum degree of consistency before a kind of experience can be treated as prima facie reliable. Unfortunately, it is not clear
how this absolute threshold can be determined. (It is not clear how degree
of contradictions can be precisely measured.) To draw the line with sensory experience alone on the clean side and the rest on the dirty side seems
arbitrary and unduly restrictive. On the other hand, suppose we take into
consideration various experiences and epistemic practices which do produce contradictory judgments to different degrees, e.g., memory, introspection, moral experience, aesthetic experience, logical intuitions, historical investigation, philosophy, literary criticism, "revolutionary science" (in
Kuhn's sense). It then seems implausible to assert any absolute threshold
of tolerable contradictions. We have yet to see a good argument for not
granting some defeasible evidential force to religious experiences sheerly
because of their alleged contradictions.
However the degree of contradictions in a type of experience does have
epistemic relevance: it serves as a possible defeater of the prima facie justification of experiences. If a kind of experience has absolutely no stability
and recognizable consistency, surely we can discount it. Here John Baillie's
comments seem to be judicious. He admits that, in discussing moral judgments, "if there were no degree of consensus as to what is right and what is
wrong, we might well come to feel that our moral judgments were no
more than individual seeming." 18 However he contends that "when we
pass to the higher regions of our experience, to what we have called our
subtler and more delicate awareness, we do not expect universal agreement." The middle way he adopts is that "some considerable measure of agreement, though it is still not a 'test of truth,' is normally a necessary condition
of the security of individual judgement."19

Dealing with Conflicts: Critical Trust versus Absolute Scepticism
If the above argument is correct, then the PCT is applicable to conflicting
religious experiences, and there is no logical incompatibility between the
CTA and religious particularism. However, the atheists may still insist that
religious particularism is still incongruent or incoherent (in a broad sense)
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with the PCT. Unless the particularists can offer a plausible explanation of
how the two go together, they maintain, the atheistic approach seems
superior. The following is a response to this possible query.
First of all, it is important to note that the PCT does not license the irrationality of swallowing a grossly inconsistent set of beliefs. To have initial
trust in contradictory experiences does not commit one to accepting all of
them. On the contrary, this is only the first step to ensure a proper initial
base on which we can then exercise our critical faculty rigorously. When
conflicts between our presumptive data occur, there is a need for critical
sifting. (That is why this approach is called the Critical Trust Approach.)
However, in line with the spirit of the PCT, we should choose the consistent subset of the presumptive data which has maximum weight.
Moreover, even when a token experience is defeated, we should strive to
preserve the elements of truth in it. Before exploring this process of critical
sifting in more details, in this section I want to defend the rationality of the
above way of dealing with conflicting experiences vis-a.-vis the atheists'
alternative, which seems to presuppose the Sceptical Rule (SR):
SR

When experiences or claims conflict with one another, we
should reject all of them.

Should we adopt the SR instead? I don't think so. Consider the conflict of
eye-witnesses' accounts of a certain event. It would indeed be irrational to
reject all their accounts just because they conflict! (Contrarily it's ironical
that perfect match between independent witnesses may sometimes induce
suspicion.) It seems to be a rational strategy to try to reconcile their reports
as much as possible. For example, a common core 20 can be identified.
Another example: suppose a fleeting phenomenon led to conflicting
reports: Peter reported seeing a plane, Paul a spaceship, and Mary an airballoon. It is absurd to suggest that we should reject all their statements
and think that nothing has happened. It is possible that one of them may
be correct. At the very least we should accept the common content of their
experiences. Unidentified flying object (UFO), vague though it is, is not a
completely uninformative term. Moreover, if the SR is adopted, history
would also be imperiled. It is well known that historical documents are
liable to massive contradictions. However, we don't deduce from this that
historical enquiry is utterly pointless and can tell us absolutely nothing.
The job of the historian is to utilize all these materials to reconstruct the
past by harmonizing them without producing too much strain in the overall interpretation. Consider the conflicting descriptions of a historical personality. These can sometimes be reconciled by the idea of perspective. A
personality can be multi-faceted and manifest itself in different ways to different people. However, each person will usually accord an unduly high
degree of ultimacy and immediacy to his encounter with that historical
personality. Removing this aura of ultimacy, each person's experience of
that historical personality can be seen to be true from his perspective. It is
also a commonplace that many historical accounts of a momentous historical event, e.g., China's Cultural Revolution, are contradictory. It is difficult
to determine the exact course or nature of this event but it would be pre-
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posterous to deny that the Cultural Revolution has happened. All the
above examples count against the sceptical policy and show that conflict of
presumptive data is not irremediable.
Many critics argue that religious experiences are so contradictory that as
a whole they must be unreliable. The apparent plausibility of this argument hinges on the ambiguity of the word "reliability." This can be used in
a comparative sense. It is true that when a kind of experience yields more
contradictory beliefs than those yielded by another, the former is less reliable than the latter. Hence the conflicts between religious experiences do
show that they are more unreliable than, say, sensory experiences, but it
does not follow that they are absolutely unreliable, in the sense that "no
information can be gained from them at all." It is not true that whenever
the token experiences conflict, the whole kind is suspect and hence "unreliable" in this sense. Even sensory experiences can't pass this test.
In this light we can evaluate Richard Gale's objection: he argues that
religious diversities would render the PCT, which he calls "presumptive
inference rule," inapplicable to religious experiences. He points out that
there is "no analogous diversity of doxastic practices for basing claims
about physical objects on sense experience that differ among themselves as
to what counts as confirmatory and disconfirmatory of a given sense experience being veridical." He claims that "This is a cognitively invidious disanalogy that should destroy the requirement to extend the presumptive
inference rule from the sense experience to the religious experience doxastic practice in the name of the principle of parity. There should be parity in
their treatment only if they are sufficiently analogous."21 It should be clear
that the objection is invalid because the dis analogy of religious experience
with sense experience in this respect only shows that the former is much
less reliable than sense experience. It would not show the absolute unreliability of religious experience unless sense experience is adopted as the paradigm. To do the latter is epistemic chauvinism.22
Hick's claim that the particularist interpretation of the conflicting religious experiences is a reversal of Alston's principle that "religious experience constitutes as legitimate a ground for belief-formation as does sense
experience" is similarly ambiguous. If it means that the conflicts show that
it is legitimate to apply the PCT to sense experience but not to religious
experience, then, as I have argued, it suffers from the confusion between the
PIR and the PCT. If it means that the conflicts between religious experiences
show that sense experience is a more reliable ground for belief-formation
than religious experience, then Hick is making a true claim which is not a
reversal of Alston's principle or the CTA. Either way, Hick's objection fails.
The distinction between comparative reliability and absolute unreliability can be further shown by the following thought experiment. Suppose an
alien species possessed a kind of perception which was 99.99% reliable.
One day they landed on the earth and started to investigate the intellectual
powers of human beings. Although they found that our sense experiences
were in fact 70% reliable, the conclusion of their report read, "Human
beings are very inferior in their cognitive power because their sense experiences are very unreliable." Is aliens' judgment justified? Yes, in a comparative sense; but no, in an absolute sense.

THE CRITICAL TRUST APPROACH

159

To sum up, we need to distinguish several senses of reliability or unreliability:
1) Comparative reliability between different types of experience
2) Type-reliability
3) Type-unreliability:
Absolute type-unreliability: the type of experience is sheer delusion and reveals nothing whatever about the reality.
Lower-level reliability: although the type is unreliable at the highest level of description, it is reliable at a lower level of
description (d. the Parable of the Survivors). In this case,
the type is a loose type.
Sub-type reliability: it is also possible that a sub-type of the typeunreliable experience can be reliable. This can be illustrated
by the case of sense experience.
When we look at the deliverances of sense experience, we find statements about location, shape, size, color, smell, taste and (felt) temperat.ure
of physical objects. According to the PCT, all of these are prima facie justified. For common sense, a physical object (objectively) possesses properties
of size, shape and location as well as of color and smell. However, the latter comes into conflict with the scientific view of a physical object which,
according to that view, solely consists of colorless and odourless particles.23
It becomes difficult to see how these physical objects can objectively possess color and smell. One solution is to make the distinction between primary qualities, e.g., shape and size, and secondary qualities, e.g., color and
smell. The former are really qualities of the physical objects while the latter
only appear to be so. In other words, this move involves a demarcation of
sense experience into two sub-types: experiences of the primary qualities
and experiences of the secondary qualities. The former are still literally
prima facie reliable while the latter are interpreted as (partly) projections of
the mind. Experiences of secondary qualities are not cognitively irrelevant
but they are no longer taken at face value. Actually the two sub-types of
sense experience do not literally contradict one another.
Phenomenologically speaking, we can't distinguish one type from the
other: experience of the whiteness of the paper and experience of its rectangular shape seem equally real and the two are integrated into a single
experience of the sheet of paper. However, the best explanation of one type
leads to an understanding of the physical object which contradicts another.
The conflict can be resolved in various ways. Some deny the conflict is
real by offering alternative interpretations of common sense statements
about physical objects. Others take an instrumentalist view of science. That
these views are to some extent attractive shows that the prima facie evidential force of the experiences of the secondary qualities is quite strong. It
seems very obvious that the paper in front of me is really white, for example. Nevertheless, if one thinks that the realist view of science and common
sense is more plausible and the proffered ways of reconciliation are not
convincing, then one has to re-interpret the experiences of color, etc. In my

160

Faith and Philosophy

terms, the prima facie evidential force of these experiences is indirectly
defeated by the best explanation of our experiences of primary qualities. If
the above account is correct, sense experiences are also indirectly inconsistent. (Martin, while insisting that many religious experiences are indirectly
inconsistent, does not seem to realize that this could also be true of sense
experience.) The common sense interpretation of experiences of secondary
qualities is not strictly consistent with the scientific interpretation of them.
The above resolution in favor of the scientific interpretation seems to reflect
the following principle, The Principle of Conservation:
In resolving conflicts between experiences, try to adopt the best and
simplest explanatory hypothesis which preserves the maximum
prima facie evidential force of the (indirectly) conflicting experiences.
It should be noted that the above conflict does not result in a whole scale

scepticism of sense experience nor rejection of science. Neither are the
experiences of the secondary qualities wholly consigned to the realm of
illusions nor completely eliminated. Those experiences are still real and
they reflect something real, i.e., dispositional properties of physical objects.
Again, it shows that conflicts of experience do not necessarily result in
whole scale rejection. Why isn't this also true of religious experiences?
Even if my account is not actually true of our sense experience, it can still
illustrate a rational strategy to deal with conflicting presumptive data.
My conclusion is that the CTA's rules for sifting data are indeed rational
strategies which are employed by us in daily life and by scholars in various
disciplines. The need for such strategies is undergirded by the recognition
that our cognitive input is fallible yet not totally unreliable. Knowledge is
not an all-or-nothing matter. It is also untrue that either we have to accept
an experience in its totality or reject it in toto. Generally speaking, the CTA
seems to be a more realistic approach than the atheists' Sceptical Rule.
Moreover, when we apply the former to conflicting experiences, various
kinds of realism rather than whole scale skepticism may often be the outcome. Let us apply this approach to conflicting religious experiences.

Religious Experience as a Loose Type
Armed with the above distinctions and principles, we can come back to
Martin's conflicting claims objection to religious experience: "Swinburne
advises us when considering a new sense to assume first that by and large
things are what they seem .... this initial assumption must be quickly abandoned in the case of religious experiences. Religious experiences are often
conflicting, and thus things cannot be what they seem. We must distinguish
what is veridical and what is not, and there is at present no non-questionbegging theory that enables us to do thiS."24 Suppose he is correct about the
degree of conflict. Does it follow that religious experiences as a whole have
no evidential force at all? If my arguments are correct, this conclusion is
unwarranted. The conflicts of religious experience may indeed show the
type-unreliability of religious experience at the highest level of description.
However, I will argue that religious experience is nevertheless a loose type
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because a common core can be extracted from the diverse religious experiences at a lower level of description.
Let's elaborate the Parable of the Survivors. Consider their "perceptions" of the sun. When they look at the sun, they see some object up there
but one sees it as round, another as square, and so on. Even worse, for an
individual he sees it as square on Monday but round on Tuesday and
hexagonal on Wednesday and so on. Obviously an object can't be both
round and square at the same time. So the object cannot be identical to
what it seems most of the time. Clearly the PIR can't be applied here.
However the application of the PCT is another matter. If they accept this
and apply it to their conflicting perceptions of the sun, they would at least
arrive at the conclusion that there is a bright object of some shape up there.
There is no need to adopt a reductionist account of the 'sun' as nothing but
projections of their minds, i.e., to discount their experiences of the sun as
absolutely unreliable. Similarly, despite the conflicts, religious experiences
still point to the fact that there is another realm up there or beyond. In other
words, although religious experiences taken as a whole hardly point to a
determinate supernatural reality, they cohere in that they all point to something beyond the naturalistic world, i.e., the Transcendent realm. It could be
fortuitous, of course. However, the collective weight of them should not be
dismissed cavalierly. It could be defeated but not without good reasons.
The most important contradiction remains that concerning the nature of
the ultimate reality. Is it personal or impersonal? Numinous experiences and
theistic experiences seem to indicate that it is personal while some mystical
experiences (e.g., the monistic type) seem to show it is impersonal.
However, even this contradiction is not irremediable. 25 Suppose the ultimate reality is indeed personal. It is possible that a personal being can
manifest himself in a non-personal way. The manifestation can still be
veridical and revelatory. Consider Yahweh's epiphany to Elijah. God can
be said to be manifested in the earthquake and the whirlwind but this is
not yet a personal manifestation. If the epiphany stops at this level, the
experient may even think that God is impersonal. However, the situation is
transformed when the "still small voice" is added to the scene. The whole
experience becomes an unambiguous personal manifestation. So a nonpersonal manifestation does not entail that the underlying reality is antipersonal. This is even more plausible when we realize that orthodox theists
always maintain that God is more than personal, i.e., the human category
of "personal" can't exhaust the nature of God. Of course, it can also be
maintained that an Impersonal Absolute can manifest itself in personal
ways. For example, some schools of Hinduism make the distinction
between the saguna-Brahman (the personal manifestation of Brahman) and
the nirguna-Brahman (the Impersonal Absolute and Ultimate). The present
point is that it is by no means impossible to organize the diverse religious
experiences into a coherent framework. Of course some revisionist moves
are inevitable but the CTA does not forbid them, provided the resulting
worldview is more coherent.>6
For example, Caroline Davis carefully sifts through the data and suggests the following as the common core:
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(i) the mundane world of physical bodies, physical processes, and
narrow centres of consciousness is not the whole or ultimate reality.
(ii) ... there is a far deeper 'true self' which in some way depends on
and participates in the ultimate reality.
(iii) Whatever is the ultimate reality is holy, eternal, and of supreme
value; it can appear to be more truly real than all else, since everything else depends on it.
(iv) This holy power can be experienced as an awesome, loving, pardoning, guiding (etc.) presence with whom individuals can have a
personal relationship ...
(v) ... at least some mystical experiences are experiences of a very
intimate union with the holy power ...
(vi) Some kind of union or harmonious relation with the ultimate
reality is the human being's summum bonum, his final liberation or
salvation, and the means by which he discovers his 'true self' or 'true
home."'27
II

Of course, this analysis is controversial and has to be backed up by
detailed arguments. Nevertheless it can plausibly be maintained that we
can extract a common core from the diverse religious experiences which
points to the fact that this spatio-temporal world is not the Ultimate. There
is more to what we can see. Religious experience as a loose type at least
supports this modest conclusion. Martin's claim that the conflicts between
religious experiences automatically render them completely useless as evidence for a religious worldview seems mistaken. While religious experiences themselves may not support a very determinate religious worldview, they at least tip the balance away from naturalism to some degree, if
the PCT is accepted.
Critical Trust: Religious Particularism versus Religious Pluralism

What has been said above is also acceptable to a pluralist. Hick may argue
that mere logical compatibility between particularism and the CT A
amounts to very little, and that his pluralist hypothesis exactly expresses
the common core of the diverse religious experiences. So his approach is
still superior to particularism, given the CT A. I investigate this possible
claim below. Note that I am not offering a comprehensive critique of Hick's
position. Here I am concerned mainly with whether his pluralism is more
coherent with the CTA than particularism. Since there are different kinds
of religious particularism and the answer to the above question may vary
with the kind of particularism chosen for consideration, I mainly consider
the theistic interpretation of religious experiences below.
It is important to emphasize that a religious particularist need not reject
all religious experiences in other religions. Only those which are truly
incompatible with her faith need to be rejected. Now a theistic faith is of
course largely compatible with the bulk of experiences of a personal God.
Moreover, a theist need not reject all kinds of mystical experience. Theistic
religions have their own mystics, who believe that their mystical experiences, e.g., union with God, rapture, are not only compatible with but also
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integral to their theistic faith. The major type of religious experience which
is clearly incompatible with theism, is monistic mysticism, e.g., the intuitive apprehension that Atman is Brahman and that All is One. This kind of
experience, if veridical at the highest level of description, is incompatible with
theism because the Ultimate disclosed in this kind of experience is not personal. However, as suggested above, theists need not completely consign
all monistic mystical experiences to the rubbish bin. They can provide
interpretations of monistic experiences which preserve their validity to different degrees.
Theists can maintain that some monistic experiences are the manifestation
of the personal God in a non-personal way. It is not at all surprising that God
will bring about these experiences, which enable us to see the emptiness of
creaturely things and our inadequacies and liberate us from the attachment
to things. Having these experiences can be the first stage in the quest for
God. In interpreting these strictly as experiences of the impersonal Absolute,
it is possible that either the mystics have misinterpreted their experiences or
others have been misled by the mystics' language, perhaps under the influence of monistic traditions. Sometimes a monistic experience may just be an
experience of the substance of one's soul which is indeed grounded in God.
Maritain suggests, "The Hindu experience does appear therefore, to be a
mystical experience in the natural order, a fruitive experience of the absolute,
of that absolute which is the substantial esse of the soul and, in it and through
it, of the divine absolute. And how could this experience, being purely negative, distinguish the one of these absolutes from the other? Inasmuch as it is
a purely negative experience, it neither confuses nor distinguishes them.
And since no content of the "essential" order, no quid, is then attained, it is
comprehensible that philosophic thought reflecting upon such an experience
inevitably runs the danger of identifying in some measure the one and the
other absolute, that absolute which is the mirror and that one which is perceived in the mirror. The same word "atman" will designate the human Self
and the supreme Self."2B
Now in comparison with the above type of particularism, is Hick's pluralism superior from the perspective of the CTA? I think not. Despite the
lip service of the pluralist to the PCT, his hypotheSis in fact does violence to
all kinds of religious experience: they are all "true" of the Real, but only in
a mythological sense. Hick explains, "I mean by a myth a story that is not
literally true but that has the power to evoke in its hearers a practical
response to the myth's referent- a true myth being of course one that
evokes an appropriate response. The truthfulness of a myth is thus a practical truthfulness, consisting in its capacity to orient us rightly in our lives. In
so far as the heavenly Parent is an authentic manifestation of the Real, to
think of the Real as an ideal parent is to think in a way that can orient us
rightly to the Real."29 This is because the Real is ineffable and incomprehensible. The Real "is postulated as that which there must be if religious experience, in its diversity of forms, is not purely imaginative projection but is
also a response to a transcendent reality."30 Referring to attributes like personality, love, goodness, compassion, justice, mercy, intentions, consciousness, knowledge, etc., Hick says that "all these attributes are components
of our human conceptual repertoire ... an ultimate reality ... exceeds that
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conceptual repertoire ... It has its own nature, presumably infinite in richness, but that nature is not thinkable in human terms.//)1
This position has the drastic consequence that no religious experience is
ever literally true of the Real, and no major type of religious experience
captures even to some degree the nature of the Real. Despite all the talk
that both theistic experiences and monistic experiences are authentic manifestation of the Real, from a cognitive and not practical standpoint, Hick is
denying in toto the content of all these experiences. 32 Hick says, "in denying
that the Real is personal one is not saying that it is impersonal, but rather
that the personal-impersonal dualism does not apply here.// 33 This is to
admit that Hick's pluralism preserves the cognitive validity of neither the
theistic type nor the non-theistic type of religious experience in which the
Real appears to be personal and impersonal respectively. In contrast, the
above theistic interpretation successfully saves a significant portion of the
phenomena, e.g., theistic experiences, and preserves to different extent the
validity of other types of religious experience, e.g., monistic experiences.
(Theists can agree that the nature of the Real is infinite in richness but this
does not entail the ineffability of the Real. This infinite richness only entails
that human terms can never fully capture or comprehend the nature of the
Real.) This is consonant with the Principle of Conservation of the CTA. If
Alston's position were the reversal of the PCT, then Hick's pluralism
would be an even greater reversal! Of course, as I have argued, both particularism and pluralism are formally compatible with the PCT but the former seems to conform better to the CTA than Hick's pluralism.34
Furthermore, the theistic interpretation preserves better the moral
nature of the Real. Hick takes pains to demonstrate that the concern for the
good is common to different religious traditions. For example, he seems to
believe that extreme cruelty is incompatible with the nature of the Real, as
implied by his condemnation of the Christian Church's misdeeds in history. However, under the constraint of his doctrine of ineffability, he has to
say this: "I do not describe the Real in itself as good, or benign, or gracious.
But in relation to us- that is, in terms of the difference that it makes to us- it
is good as the ground of the transformed state which is our highest good.
So the sense in which the Real is good, benign, gracious is analogous to
that in which the sun is, from our point of view, good, friendly, life-giving ... Likewise, the Real is the necessary condition of our existence and our
highest good. It is in this sense that we can speak of the Real as being, in
relation to us, good, benign, gracious. But when we describe the Real in
itself in these terms we are speaking mythologically rather than literally.//35
This consequence is rather depressing. In contrast, theism can speak of
the Real as literally or at least analogously gracious and good.'" This is a
merit from the perspective of the CTA because that the Real is good and
gracious is the common content of many diverse religious experiences, and
is endorsed by the major traditions. Given Hick's emphasis on the moral
criterion, it is indeed strange that moral categories cannot even apply to the
Real. On Hick's terms, can we say that extreme cruelty is really incompatible with the nature of the Real? No, we can only say that the Real is not the
ground of cruelty, and so on. Is this kind of roundabout statement about
the causal relationship between cruelty and the Real really expressing the
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essence of our intuition, which Hick seems to share, that extreme cruelty is
an absolute evil? It is clear that all these questions do not plague theism
which can forthrightly says that extreme cruelty is logically incompatible
with the holy nature of God. There is no need for theists to posit the tortuous noumenal-phenomenal distinction here.
Hick has likened the Real to the sun above. Let us come back to the survivors' conflicting perceptions of the sun in my parable. Now suppose
there are three major schools about the shape of the sun: Round Sun
School, Square Sun School, and Hexagonal Sun School. Further suppose
all three schools are equally supported by the survivors' experience, and all
of them cannot prove on neutral grounds the superiority of their positions.
In this impasse there comes a Pluralist, who argues that each of the three
positions is arbitrary and unjustified. He argues that the only solution is to
postulate a Noumenal Sun which is invisible and shapeless. (To be more
accurate, we should say the whole category of spatial or visual attributes is
inapplicable to the Noumenal Sun.) All the experiences of the Round Sun,
Square Sun and Hexagonal Sun are unveridical, literally speaking.
Nevertheless, the Round Sun, Square Sun and Hexagonal Sun are authentic
manifestations of the Noumenal Sun because they can all orient people
appropriately to the Noumenal Sun. The Pluralist claims that his hypothesis is the best and most comprehensive explanation because it has taken
account of all their experiences. 37 In contrast, each of the three schools has
only taken account of one-third of the experiences, hence is inferior. How
should we think of this Pluralist? Isn't it quite clear that the postulation of a
Noumenal Sun here is rather farfetched and unnecessary? Moreover, his
claim to comprehensiveness is bogus because the Pluralist's "taking
account of an experience" amounts only to "granting that experience a
merely phenomenal status." After he has "taken account of all the experiences," all experiences, at least one-third of which have been deemed reliable before, are now completely divorced from the Real Sun, from the cognitive viewpoint. I can imagine all three Schools protesting in one voice that
the Pluralist is in fact contemptuous of all their experiences. Anyway, it is
by no means clear that the Pluralist's position is superior to either School.
The implications for religious pluralism should be clear.
To fully establish the superiority of the theistic interpretation of religious experiences, a lot more needs to be said. However, the purpose here
is more modest. I just want to outline a reply to Hick's charge that from the
perspective of the CTA, particularism is inferior to pluralism. The above
discussions suggest that theism has more strategies to handle diverse religious experiences than Hick tends to believe, and those strategies are consonant with the CTA. Moreover, Hick's doctrine of the ineffability of the
Real seriously endangers the cognitive validity of aU religious experiences,
which is exactly what the PCT is supposed to protect as far as possible. The
tables are turned against Hick. Before he can satisfactorily deal with all the
issues, it is premature for him to declare victory.

Conclusion
The CTA advises us to trust all religious experiences. A religious particular-
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ist believes that only one world religion is basically correct. So on the surface it seems that a religious particularist cannot adopt the CTA. This is a
misunderstanding. On the one hand, the trust advocated is only a prima Jacie
trust. The CTA in itself does not favour any particular position on religious
diversity because it only asserts the prima facie evidential force of religious
experiences. We must bear in mind the critical elements of the CTA. If sufficient reasons are given for doubting religious experiences, the CTA can
happily co-exist with atheism. On the other hand, while a religious particularist will not accept many religious experiences of other religions at the
highest level oj description, he does not need to deny that those experiences
may contain elements of truth at a lower level of description. If he adopts
the CTA, then he would think that in face of conflicting prima facie justified
beliefs or experiences, it is rational to salvage something from them.
1 have argued that this strategy is actually feasible in many other cases,
and may also be feasible in the case of religious diversity. The presence of
conflicts between religious experiences is not in itself a sufficient reason for
adopting the atheist option. To do so would be analogous to rejecting all
eye-witnesses' reports just because they conflict with one another. It may
be possible to identify a "common core" of diverse religious experiences.
While this does not settle the debates between religions, it may tip the balance towards a religious world view. 1 have also indicated that type-umeliability can be combined with sub-type-reliability. So, for example,theistic
experience can be separated from non-theistic experiences and then its subtype-reliability investigated separately. (A similar strategy, of course, is
open to believers of other religions.) Surely the problem of conflicts
between theistic experience and theism-incompatible religious experiences
remains. The theist need not insist that the conflict can be resolved entirely
on neutral grounds; he need only show that he is not irrational in trusting
his theistic experiences. How this position is to be worked out must be left
for another time. The burden of this paper is that this position is compatible with the CTA, and is arguably superior to the atheist or pluralist solutions from the perspective of the CTA. (1 leave open the possibility that
Hick's hypothesis might be correct.) So it seems misguided to deny that
religious exclusivism can be combined with the CTA.
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